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I. INTRODUCTION
The Great Recession of 2007–2009 and its aftermath have posed the most serious
challenge to unemployment insurance (UI) financing since state UI programs were established
during the late 1930s. Since 2008, 36 of the 53 state UI programs have borrowed from the U.S.
Treasury to finance benefit payments in the so-called regular state UI programs, the statefinanced programs that typically pay up to 26 weeks of benefits to claimants. State program
loans from the Treasury peaked in April 2012 at $41 billion, larger than in any previous
recession. In order to repay these loans, states have raised their UI payroll tax rates during a
sluggish recovery, and their payroll tax rates will remain relatively high until states’ UI trust
funds are replenished. Nevertheless, if the recovery continues at its current modest pace, it seems
likely that several large states will owe substantial amounts beyond 2015. Also, a recession in the
next few years would return many state trust funds to insolvency and lead to further borrowing.
This article examines the financial problems facing the state UI systems and reviews
possible ways of placing those systems on a more stable footing. In section II, we provide
background on the UI system and briefly describe the mechanics of UI financing. In section III,
we review the current state of UI trust fund solvency and how the current situation came about.
In section IV, we consider the two main components of the UI payroll tax—the taxable wage
base and the experience-rated payroll tax—and examine how these might be modified to avoid
future widespread insolvency of the kind that accompanied the Great Recession. Section V offers
a discussion and speculative remarks on the future of UI financing.

II. UI FINANCING BASICS
UI was established in 1935 under the Social Security Act, which created strong financial
incentives for each state to create its own UI program. Specifically, the Federal Unemployment
Tax Act (FUTA) levies a payroll tax on private employers, currently 6.0 percent of the first
$7,000 of each covered worker’s annual earnings. The FUTA then forgives or “credits” 5.4
percent of that tax for employers in states operating a UI program meeting federal requirements
(Blaustein 1993).1 The main requirements were and are quite general: administer a UI program
using “methods of administration ... reasonably calculated to insure full payment of
unemployment compensation when due” [42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(1)] and raise revenues for that
program through an experience rated payroll tax levied on (at least) the federal tax base, and
whose maximum tax rate is no lower than 5.4 percent. Accordingly, UI payroll taxes have both a
federal component (after the FUTA credit, 0.6 percent of $7,000 for each employee) and a state
component, determined by each state, that funds UI benefits administered by the state.
To qualify for the 5.4 percent FUTA credit, revenues from a state’s payroll tax must be
deposited in a reserve account or trust fund, held for that state by the U.S. Treasury and used
solely to pay benefits under that state’s UI program (Rubin 1983; Hildebrand 1995–1996).
Otherwise the states have much freedom to set specific tax provisions and benefits. The result is
a federal-state program or “partnership” in which each of the 50 states (plus the District of
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Nonprofit employers and state and local government employers do not pay FUTA taxes, although their employees
are potentially eligible for UI. Rather than paying regular state UI payroll taxes, these employers usually reimburse
the state for benefits paid to their former employees. Small farm employers and self-employed workers are wholly
exempt from UI coverage.
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Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands) finances and administers its own UI program
under federal guidelines and oversight.2
A. The Taxable Wage Base and Payroll Tax Rates
The latitude granted to states by the Social Security Act has led to marked differences
among the states in most aspects of the UI program—financing, program solvency, eligibility,
and benefit generosity. Subject to the federal minimum of $7,000, states have set UI payroll tax
bases (or “taxable wage bases”) that vary widely (USDOL 2013, chapter 2). Although the UI tax
base is higher than the $7,000 minimum in all but two states (Arizona and California), the UI tax
base exceeded $25,000 in just twelve in 2013 (Washington’s and Hawaii’s were highest, at
$38,200 and $38,800). In these latter twelve, the base is adjusted automatically each year by
indexation to the state’s average annual wage. The tax base was $12,000 or less in twenty-two
states, and in none of these was the tax base indexed. Of the 16 states that index, all but six
(Iowa, Minnesota, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, and Oklahoma) are in the West (as
defined by the U.S. Census Bureau), and of the 12 largest states, only New Jersey and North
Carolina had 2013 tax bases greater than $12,000 and indexed their base. Accordingly, state UI
tax bases are much smaller than the Social Security base ($113,700 in 2013). The implications of
low state UI tax bases for UI trust fund insolvency following the 2007–2008 financial crisis will
become clear below.
Tax rates applied to each state’s taxable wage base have two main components. The first
and usually most important component is experience rated at the level of the employer, so in
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Revenues from the FUTA tax (the 0.6 percent remaining after the 5.4 percent credit) are deposited in federal trust
accounts that finance the costs of administering UI at the federal and state levels, fund public employment services
throughout the country, pay the federal share (one-half) of federal-state extended benefits, and provide loans to
states that have exhausted their UI trust funds.
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principle each employer’s tax rate depends on the extent to which that employer has laid off
workers who have received UI benefits (USDOL 2013, chapter 2). Experience rating was a
hallmark of the UI law in 1935 and was originally touted as a way to distribute the cost of UI
equitably among employers and to discourage employers from laying off workers (Blaustein
1993). It remains a unique feature of the U.S. system.
Implementing experience rating requires two steps. First, benefits paid to each UI
recipient are “charged” to the recipient’s former employer. This is done using administrative
wage reports submitted quarterly by all employers, making it possible to identify the employer
for whom each UI claimant worked in roughly the year before the UI claim (the so-called base
period).3 Second, each employer’s benefit charges are used to calculate a measure of layoff
experience that can be mapped into a tax rate. Details and analysis of the two most important
experience rating measures are discussed below.
Figure 1 shows three illustrative tax schedules to which an experience rating measure
might be applied. Under a baseline tax schedule such as A, an employer’s tax rate rises with
layoff experience up to some maximum (τmax), which by federal law cannot be less than 5.4
percent. Such a tax cap is characteristic of all UI payroll tax schedules and limits the
effectiveness of experience rating. In particular, the maximum has been shown to reallocate
resources from low- to high-unemployment industries, as discussed later.
Tax schedules B and B' illustrate alternative tax schedules that a state could adopt if its
trust fund became depleted. In fact, about half the states automatically adjust their tax schedules
depending on the actuarial health of the state’s UI trust fund (USDOL 2013). A few, like
3

When benefits are paid to a worker with multiple previous employers, most states charge benefits in proportion to
the wages an employer paid during the base period, but thirteen charge only the most recent or principal employer,
and five charge in reverse chronological order.
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Colorado and Tennessee, do so by levying a constant percentage-point increase on all employers,
shifting the tax schedule up in a parallel manner, as in the case of schedule B. But most states
increase the payroll tax by a constant percentage on all employers, increasing the slope of the tax
schedule and raising the degree of experience rating for employers on the sloped portion of the
tax schedule, as in the case of schedule B'. New York takes this latter approach: in 2013 its law
specified 12 payroll tax schedules, one of which is effective depending on the size of its UI trust
fund relative to total payrolls in the state <https://labor.ny.gov/ui/dande/title6.shtm#581>. With a
negative trust fund balance (as in 2013), tax rates range between 0.9 and 8.9 percent (the least
favorable schedule); with a balance exceeding 5 percent of total payroll, taxes would range
between 0.0 and 5.9 percent (the most favorable).
The experience rated component of the UI payroll tax is intended to cover benefits that
can be traced or charged to an employer, but not all benefits can (or should) be charged. For
example, benefits paid to workers who have quit with good cause, dependents’ allowances, and
emergency extended benefits are “noncharged” benefits. Benefits traceable to employers that
have gone out of business are “inactively” charged. Those traceable to an employer at the
maximum UI payroll tax rate are “ineffectively” charged; in this last case, a layoff is traceable to
an employer but does not increase the employer’s tax rate and result in larger payments to the UI
trust fund. The second component of the UI payroll tax—a flat rate that is not experience rated
and applies to all employers—covers these so-called socialized benefits. This flat-rate
component is shown by the minimum rate (τmin) in Figure 1.

5

B. State Trust Fund Solvency
Unlike Social Security, UI is not a pay-as-you-go system, at least in principle. Rather, the
intent of having each state place its UI payroll taxes in a trust fund with the U.S. Treasury is to
“forward-fund” UI so that in a recession funds needed to pay benefits will be available and UI
will serve as an automatic stabilizer (Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation 1995,
chapter 5).
The simplest measure of trust fund solvency is the reserve ratio—net trust fund reserves
as a percentage of total payrolls—which can be calculated for each state individually or for all
states aggregated. Figure 2 shows that the aggregate reserve ratio (the darker line) has trended
downward over the last 50 years; indeed, in the years preceding the Great Recession, the
aggregate reserve ratio was lower than it had been before any other recent recession. Figure 2
also shows a key reason for this decline: the tax revenues collected for UI (as measured by the UI
“cost ratio,” or tax contributions as a percentage of total wages) trended down from 1.0–1.3
percent during the 1980s, to 0.5–0.8 percent during the 2000s (the lighter line).
Low and declining reserve ratios have three consequences. First, when unemployment
rises in a recession, the trust funds of states with low reserves quickly become insolvent; these
states must borrow (usually from the federal government) to pay UI benefits. For example,
during and after the Great Recession, the trust funds of 36 states became insolvent, and these
states borrowed in excess of $40 billion from the federal government (Vroman 2011).
Second, states that borrow must ultimately repay the federal loans, usually with interest,
which means raising above-normal revenues. As already discussed, in most states, tax rates rise
automatically when trust funds become depleted, and states may add surcharges to repay loans.

6

Further, if loans are not repaid in a timely manner, the federal government assesses penalties
through reductions in the FUTA tax credit. These reductions (which are effectively tax increases)
may occur in a weak economy and a slack labor market (as they have during the Great
Recession), placing a drag on recovery and hampering the ability of UI to act as an automatic
stabilizer. A state that forward funds UI by building up adequate trust funds during a period of
growth avoids such fiscal drag (Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation 1995,
chapter 5).
To avoid the FUTA tax penalties and the above-market interest rates charged by the
Federal government on loans, several states have issued bonds in the private market and repaid
their federal loans. Idaho, Illinois, Michigan, and Texas have all taken this approach. Although
issuing private debt does not reduce a state’s indebtedness, it may reduce the cost of servicing
that debt, and it makes sense as a strategy to avoid the federal government’s penalty charges on
loans that are not quickly repaid.
A third consequence of insolvent state UI trust funds has been reductions in benefit
amounts and maximum durations, reducing UI payouts and allowing UI trust funds to be
replenished more quickly. For example, since 2009, eight states have reduced weekly benefit
amounts or shortened the duration of benefits to less than 26 weeks to limit UI payroll tax
increases and reduce the burden of repaying their loans (Vroman 2011; Lancaster 2013). These
measures do reduce the cost of UI, but they also reduce the effectiveness of the UI program and
its consumption-smoothing benefits.

7

III. ORIGINS OF THE CURRENT PROBLEM
The scale of state UI trust fund insolvency following the Great Recession reflected the
combined effects of three factors—low pre-recession trust fund reserves, the unusual depth and
duration of the recession, and the timing of the downturn. The combination of these factors could
be characterized as a perfect storm in their effects on UI trust funds.
A. Low Pre-Recession Reserves
Figure 2 shows that the reserve ratio consistently exceeded 2.0 percent of payroll before
1973, but it has never reached 2.0 percent since. Three early periods of economic recovery were
accompanied by large-scale replenishment of trust fund reserves (1961–1969, 1976–1979, and
1983–1989). Notably, between 1983 and 1989, the reserve ratio increased from –0.47 percent to
1.92 percent. Later recoveries have had much smaller increases in reserves. As a result, the
reserve ratio was 0.79 percent of payroll in December 2007, the lowest ever for a pre-recession
year.
	


An alternative measure of UI trust fund adequacy is the reserve ratio multiple (also called

the high cost multiple), which a ratio of two ratios. The numerator is the reserve ratio—reserves
as percentage of payroll—the series shown in Figure 2. The denominator is the highest previous
annual benefit payout rate, also expressed as a percentage of payroll. The Advisory Council on
Unemployment Compensation (1995, chapter 5), among other groups, suggested that a prerecession reserve ratio multiple of 1.5 (representing 18 months of benefits under very adverse
conditions) should be considered adequate. The reserve ratio multiple was 2.22 percent in 1975,
but it trended down over the following four decades, so that at the end of 2007 it was 0.36.
Although aggregate net reserves totaled $38.2 billion at the end of 2007, the associated reserve
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ratio multiple of only 0.36 meant that the reserves represented only 4.3 months of benefits when
paid at the highest-ever rate. The downward trend of trust fund reserves since the mid 1980s
meant that state UI programs entered the Great Recession with historically low reserves.
B. The Deep Recession and Slow Recovery
	


The recession that started in November 2007 was the deepest and longest of the post–

World War II period. Between 2007 and 2009, the national unemployment rate doubled from 4.6
percent to 9.3 percent, then increased to 9.6 percent in 2010. Although the unemployment rate
had fallen slowly to 7.0 percent by late 2013, the labor market had by no means recovered by
that time: the employment/population ratio, which was about 63 percent during 2005–2007,
dropped to about 58.5 percent by the end of 2009 and remained close to that level through 2013.
Moreover, the mean duration of unemployment reached 29.7 weeks in 2009, 34.7 weeks in 2010,
and peaked at 40.7 weeks in 2011. It still exceeded 35 weeks at the end of 2013. Before the Great
Recession, mean duration of unemployment had been as high as 20.0 weeks just once, in 1983.
	


The Great Recession, with its high unemployment and unusually long unemployment

spells, caused a large and rapid increase in UI benefit payments, depleting state UI reserves and
requiring most states to borrow from the federal government to cover benefits. Table 1
summarizes annual unemployment and UI benefits from 2007 to 2012, showing separately
regular state benefits, federal emergency benefits (known as EUC08), federal-state extended
benefits (the “standby” program that is intended to activate automatically in a slack labor
market), and federal additional benefits. This last category resulted from a temporary program
that added $25 per week to the benefits paid to all UI recipients during most of 2009 and 2010.
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During 2009 and 2010, total UI benefits (including federal emergency benefits paid to the

long-term unemployed) were four times total benefits of 2007, and total benefits during 2011
were three times the 2007 total. All four payment types shown in the table contributed to these
increases. During 2010 and 2011, payments from the two extended benefit programs exceeded
regular UI benefits for the first time in the history of programs, which date back to 1958.
In addition to high benefit pay-outs, the slow recovery and low employment growth have
led to reduced UI payroll tax revenues since 2008. In the decade before the recession, UIcovered employment grew at an annual average rate of 1.1 percent. If covered employment had
grown by 1.0 percent per year after 2007, it would have reached 113.3 million in 2010, but actual
covered employment was 103.4 million in 2012 (the latest year for which UI-covered
employment data are available), a gap of nearly 10 percent. The Hamilton Project has estimated
that, even if employment were to grow at the highest rate of the 2000s, this “jobs gap,” would
persist until mid 2019 (http://www.hamiltonproject.org/jobs_gap/). Vroman (2011) estimated that
the depressing effect on UI tax revenue during 2009, 2010, and 2011 averaged more than $3.0
billion per year.
C. Timing of the Downturn
	


A third factor contributing to insolvency is that most states decide which of several UI

payroll tax schedules to use for the upcoming calendar year based on trust fund reserves as of
June 30. Net reserves on June 30 are usually similar to reserves at the end of the year, but this
was not the case in 2008. Because UI payouts increased sharply during the second half of 2008
(roughly $10 billion more than in the second half of 2007), the end-of-year balance in 2008 was
$10.7 billion lower than it had been six months earlier ($29.0 versus $39.7 billion). Thus,
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employers in most states were taxed at relatively low rates during 2009 because very little of the
late-2008 surge in benefits entered the calculations determining their 2009 tax rates (Vroman
2011.
IV. RESTORING TRUST FUND SOLVENCY
A. The Taxable Wage Base
The most widely discussed way to improve the UI system’s finances is to increase the
payroll tax base and index it to some measure of earnings (Woodbury and Simms 2011, 21–33).
This could be done by states individually, or by Congressional action to increase and index the
federal taxable wage base.
Increasing and indexing the taxable wage base is central to the long-term health of
financing UI for two reasons. First, if earnings increase over time, then tax revenues must
increase in proportion to earnings to fund benefits with a 50 percent replacement rate (unless the
unemployment rate were to show a long-term downward trend, which it has not). Indexing the
tax base to wage levels is the most direct way to accomplish this. Second, Vroman (2011) finds a
high correlation between indexing the tax base and trust fund solvency: only 6 of the 16 state UI
programs that indexed had to borrow from the federal government during the Great Recession,
whereas 29 of the 35 that did not index needed to borrow.
Since the mid 1980s, 16 states have set the taxable wage base as a specified percentage of
the state average annual wage. The percentages range from 50 percent (in North Carolina and
Oklahoma) to 100 percent (in Hawaii and Idaho). The importance of automating the process of
increasing the tax base stems from states’ reluctance to enact increases except during financial
crises. Figure 3 illustrates the situation using data from 1970 to 2012. During these years, the
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federal UI tax base increased from $3,000 in 1970 to $7,000 in 1983, where it has remained
since. The figure shows the simple average of the taxable wage base for the 16 states that index
and for the 35 that do not. The average tax base for the indexed states was $28,700. In contrast,
the average for the 35 in 2012 was $10,682, less than $4,000 above the $7,000 federal tax base.
	


Because states that index their wage base have higher ratios of the taxable wages to

average wages, they also have higher reserve ratio multiples than states that do not index. On the
eve of the Great Recession in December 2007, the simple mean of the average reserve ratio
multiple for indexing states was 0.83, whereas it was 0.41 for states that do not index. As already
noted, indexing states were far less likely to require U.S. Treasury loans during the Great
Recession than were non-indexing states. This link between indexing and long-run state trust
fund solvency is too obvious to overlook.
B. Tax Rates and Experience Rating
An alternative to raising the taxable wage base would be to increase tax rates; however,
this alternative has received little attention, both because the federal government has little
leverage over tax rates and because raising rates on an ever-shrinking base would not solve the
UI system’s long-term funding problems. Rather, most discussions of UI payroll tax rates have
focussed on the degree to which they are experience rated.
All but three small states use either a benefit ratio or a reserve ratio formula to translate
information on benefit charges into an employer’s tax rate. Under the benefit ratio (BR)
approach, benefits charged to the employer during the past three to five years (charges) are
divided by the employer’s average taxable payroll during the same period (payroll):
BR = charges / payroll

12

The BR then maps into a tax rate. The mapping may be direct, in which case an employer with
benefit charges of $10,000 and average taxable payroll of $1,000,000 would face a tax rate of 1
percent.
The BR approach is simple and responds quickly to additional layoffs, but it has been
criticized for two reasons. First, it appears to reflect a pay-as-you-go approach to financing UI,
increasing an employer’s tax rate only after layoffs have occurred, and not reducing the tax rate
if an employer avoids layoffs; that is, it punishes “bad” behavior but does not reward “good”
behavior. The BR system has also been criticized for having a short memory—that is, it appears
to “forgive” an employer’s layoffs after three or four years (Advisory Council on Unemployment
Compensation 1996).
The main alternative to the BR approach is the reserve ratio (RR) approach, under which
each employer has a specific reserve account to which all taxes paid are credited and from which
all benefit charges are debited. An employer’s RR then equals its reserves divided by average
payroll in recent (usually the last three) years:
RR = reserves / payroll
A lower RR maps into a higher tax rate, but the mapping is not nearly as straightforward as with
the BR system (see USGAO 2006, appendix II, for an example). The key to the RR system is
that it has an infinite memory, so that a firm may build up reserves to the point where it pays the
minimum tax rate even if it incurs substantial charges. This cannot occur under the BR system.
Two advantages of the RR approach are that it embodies the idea of forward-funding on
which the UI system is nominally based, and it rewards “good” behavior (Advisory Council on
Unemployment Compensation 1995). A third feature of the RR approach, the advantages of
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which have been debated, is that an employer’s tax rate responds slowly (if at all) to increased
layoffs, with the result that tax revenues respond slowly when a state’s trust fund becomes
depleted (Tannenwald and O’Leary 1997). The implication is that employers are less likely to be
hampered by tax increases in the early stages of a recovery, but a state’s trust fund may be slow
to recover following a recession.
1. Incomplete Experience Rating and Tax Equity
As shown in Figure 1, tax rates under both the BR and RR systems are capped at a
maximum. The effects of this tax cap on tax equity have been studied extensively, and the
empirical evidence suggests that incomplete experience rating leads to subsidization of unstable
employers and industries by stable employers and industries, and a reallocation of resources to
the unstable industries (see USGAO 2006 for a review). Subsidized employers (and industries)
pay less in UI payroll taxes than their laid-off employees receive in benefits, whereas subsidizing
employers pay more than their laid-off employees receive.
For example, Anderson and Meyer (1993) examine cross-subsidies by one-digit industry
in 22 states during the 1980s and find that construction; manufacturing; mining; and agriculture,
forestry, and fisheries are subsidized in most states, whereas finance, insurance, and real estate;
trade; and services are usually subsidizers. Using a measure that gives an overall picture of the
extent of cross-subsidization in a state over a given period of time—the subsidy/tax ratio—
Woodbury (2007) estimates that about one-quarter (23 to 25 percent) of all taxes paid by
employers in Missouri and Washington State from the mid 1980s through the mid 1990s were
shifted from employers who effectively subsidized the UI system to employers who were
subsidized (see the row labeled “Existing” in Table 2).
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These estimates of the extent of cross-subsidization suggest some degree of inequity in
the financing of UI, so it is also useful to estimate how changing the degree of experience rating
would reduce cross-subsidization and affect UI financing more broadly. The most widely
discussed way of increasing experience rating is to raise the tax cap. Table 2 shows the estimated
effects of raising the cap by 50 percent and 100 percent, based on simulations using employerlevel data (again from Missouri and Washington State from the mid 1980s through the mid
1990s). The estimates suggest that raising the payroll tax cap would reduce the subsidy/tax ratio
by about 2 percentage points in Missouri, and by 2–3 percentage points in Washington. The
results also suggest that, in both states, raising the tax cap would allow the entire tax schedule to
shift down significantly without reducing overall revenues (see the Δτ columns): in Missouri, the
schedule could shift down by about 11–19 percent, and in Washington by 7–9 percent. Not
surprisingly, when employers who place a relatively large burden on the system are required to
pay a larger share of the costs, the burden on other employers can be reduced.
2. Other Effects of Experience Rating
Two effects of experience rating on firms’ behavior have also been discussed in the
literature. First, if experience rating causes employers to reduce layoffs as intended, then
incomplete experience rating should cause employers to substitute temporary layoffs for hours
reductions when demand is slack (Topel 1984, Deere 1991, Card and Levine 1994). The
evidence on this issue is substantial: Card and Levine (1994) estimate that, if UI payroll taxes
were fully experience rated, the rate of temporary layoff unemployment would fall by about 50
percent in the trough of a recession and during the lowest demand months of the year. Topel
(1990), in his cogent discussion of experience rating policy, has suggested that experience rating
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could be increased, and efficiency improved, by uncapping payroll tax schedules, charging
interest on negative balances in employers’ reserve accounts, and reducing the number of noncharging provisions in states’ regulations.
A second behavioral impact of experience rating has also been discussed, but only
anecdotal evidence exists to support it: in principle, experience rating increases the employer’s
stake in UI and gives employers an incentive to monitor the system. This should improve
enforcement of UI eligibility requirements and check the cost of the system to a degree that
would not occur if the UI system were financed from general revenues and enforced solely by a
government bureaucracy. But such a political economy argument has two sides: Vroman (2001)
has criticized experience rating because it creates an incentive for employers to unfairly
challenge the UI claims of their former employees, so as to prevent increases in their tax rate. It
also creates a reason for employers to lobby against relaxed monetary eligibility requirements
and more generous benefits. This argument suggests that reducing the role of employers in UI
would eliminate an interest group that is perceived to have been effective in reducing the
generosity of UI benefits.
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V. THE FUTURE OF UI FINANCING
UI policy has been shaped by diverse parties at both the federal and state levels. State UI
agencies are at the center of the UI program and are represented by the National Association of
State Workforce Agencies (NASWA), which refers to itself as “the collective voice of state
agencies on workforce policies and issues” (NASWA 2012). Employers have a financial stake in
the system and have been represented by UWC—Strategic Services on Unemployment and
Workers’ Compensation, a Washington-based membership organization (<http://
www.UWCstrategy.org/About-Us/Mission-Statement.aspx>). The so-called federal partner in UI
includes the U.S. Congress, the White House, and most directly the Office of UI, the Chief
Economist, and regional offices of the USDOL (West and Hildebrand 1997, 548). These groups
within the federal government have often held different views about the UI program,
complicating matters for the states and employers. In addition, outside parties—worker
advocates like the National Employment Law Project (NELP) and researchers in academe and
think tanks—have expressed views and performed extensive research on the UI program. The
interactions among these groups and parties have created a complex environment for the
formation and conduct of policy.
From the standpoint of UI financing, the relationships among employers, the states, and
the federal partner have been crucial. In particular, the federal-state “partnership” has led to
uncertainty and confusion about where responsibility for an adequate UI system lies (Rubin
1990; O’Leary 2013). Congress has sent mixed signals about its willingness to ensure the
viability of the federal-state UI system. On one hand, it has not acted to raise the taxable wage
base or improve the UI system’s finances, and it has resisted calls for rigid federal standards on
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eligibility and benefits. On the other hand, it has gradually increased the number of federal
requirements (Hildebrand 1995–1996), extended benefits to greater lengths than in any previous
recession under EUC08, and passed a 2009 legislative package known as “UI Modernization,”
which gave states financial incentives to broaden eligibility for benefits. All these actions suggest
a greater Congressional will to assert authority over UI.
For their part, most states (especially large ones) appear to be pulling back from a
commitment to UI. The long-term decline in average UI tax rates (Figure 2) and states’
reluctance to increase the UI taxable wage base are clear evidence of this, and the most obvious
outcome of this weakened support has been the insolvency of most states’ UI trust funds. In
short, a distaste for payroll taxes and concerns about the work disincentives associated with UI—
the unemployment created by UI, as Feldstein (1976) called it—seem to dominate the at the state
level.
In addition, several states (Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Michigan, Missouri, North
Carolina, and South Carolina) have reduced the maximum duration of regular benefits to less
than 26 weeks since 2010. These actions can be seen at least partly as a response to Congress’s
apparent willingness to step in and finance emergency extended benefits whenever the labor
market is weak. In effect, the states may be reading Congressional action as relieving them of the
need to finance UI benefits for 26 weeks, which has been the norm since the early 1960s
(Blaustein 1993, 302–306).
Whether this divergence between federal and state policy will lead to abandonment of the
federal-state arrangement, and its replacement by a national UI system, is an open question. As
Rubin (1990, 219) pointed out, “There are no ‘states’ rights’ limitations on the authority of
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Congress to impose whatever provisions it wishes, or to substitute a national program for the
present hybrid.” Indeed, a national system has had advocates from the start and would have
several advantages—a pooled national trust fund (hence, broader sharing of unemployment risk),
uniform coverage, consistent treatment of employers with multi-state operations, and potentially
more efficient administration (West and Hildebrand 1997, 546–547).
Nevertheless, the federal-state UI system has proven remarkably durable and has its own
advantages—decentralized policy authority and presumed greater accountability of state
administrators to a state’s needs, a system that is potentially better suited to a state’s economic
conditions, and the possibility for state-level experimentation. Moreover, the vested interests of
the states in their systems and the near-certain aversion of Congress to another large federal
bureaucracy would seem to make nationalization an unlikely prospect. However financially
troubled the existing federal-state UI system may be, it seems likely to continue intact.
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Table 1
Table 1UI Benefits, 2007–2012
Unemployment and Annual
Unemployment and Annual UI Benefits, 2007–2012

2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

Number
Unemployed
(Million) Regular State
7.1
32.4
8.9
43.1
14.3
78.8
14.8
58.6
13.7
47.2
12.5
43.1

Unemployment Benefits ($Billion)
Emergency Federal-State
Federal
Extended
Extended
Additional
na
na
na
7.8
na
na
42.3
6.0
9.5
66.0
9.2
10.3
47.2
10.0
na
35.7
2.9
na

Total
32.4
51.0
136.6
144.0
104.4
76.5

Note: "Regular State" refers to benefits from the state-financed programs that usually provide up to 26
weeks
of benefits.
"Emergency
refers the
to the
extended benefits
financed
the federal
Notes: “Regular
State”
refers toExtended"
benefits from
state-financed
programs
thatbyusually
provide
government
under
EUC08.
"Federal-State
Extended"
refers
to
extended
benefits
(usually
financed
up to 26 weeks of benefits. “Emergency Extended” refers to the extended benefits financed by
jointly
by the
states and under
the federal
government)
that are Extended”
designed to refers
activatetoautomatically
in a
the
federal
government
EUC08.
“Federal-State
extended benefits
recession.
"Federal
Additional"
refers
to
the
temporary
program
under
the
American
Recovery
and
(usually financed jointly by the states and the federal government) that are intended to activate
Reinvestment in
Acta of
2009 that“Federal
added $25
per week torefers
the UItobenefit
amount paid
to UI recipients
automatically
recession.
Additional”
the temporary
program
under the
during
2009
and
2010.
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 that added $25 per week to the UI benefit
Sources: Number unemployed from Bureau of Labor Statistics; unemployment benefits from U.S.
amount paid to UI recipients during 2009 and 2010.
Department of Labor, Office of Unemployment Insurance, Unemployment Insurance Program
Sources: Number unemployed from Bureau of Labor Statistics <www.bls.gov/cps/>;
Statistics <http://www.oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/finance.asp>.

unemployment benefits from U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Unemployment Insurance,
Unemployment Insurance Program Statistics <http://www.oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/
finance.asp>.
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Table 2

Table 2
Subsidy/tax ratios (S/T) and tax schedule shifts (Δτ) under existing UI payroll tax
Subsidy/tax ratios (S/T) and tax schedule shifts (Δτ) under existing UI payroll tax
systems
andspecified
specifiedchanges,
changes, Missouri
(1991-1995)
systems
and
Missouri(1985-95)
(1985-95)and
andWashington
Washington
(1991-1995)
Missouri

Washington

Tax system

S/T

Δτ

S/T

Δτa

Existing
Maximum tax rate increase:
50 percent
100 percent
no cap

23.2

0.000

25.1

0.000

21.1
21.0
23.1

–0.114
–0.191
–0.332

23.0
22.3
21.9

–0.066
–0.090
–0.105

Sample size
Population N

a

12,322
47,882

14,777
58,401

Source: Woodbury (2007). Simulations assume no change in employers’ layoff behavior resulting
from changes
in the
payrollSimulations
tax system, are
based no
on change
balancedinsamples
of employers
active in all
Source:
Woodbury
(2007).
assume
employers’
layoff behavior
resulting
years
(11
years
in
Missouri
and
5
in
Washington),
and
are
normalized
so
that
aggregate
payroll
taxin all
from changes in the payroll tax system, are based on balanced samples of employers active
revenues
in
a
state
equal
aggregate
benefit
charges
in
the
state
over
the
years
in
question.
Figures
are
years (11 years in Missouri and 5 in Washington), and are normalized so that aggregate payroll
weighted to reflect the population of employers active in all years.
tax revenues in a state equal aggregate benefit charges in the state over the years in question.
Figures
weighted to reflect
employers
active
in existing
all years.
a. Δτ =are
percentage-point
shift inthe
thepopulation
payroll tax of
schedule
(relative
to the
system) consistent
a. Δτ
=
percentage-point
shift
in
the
payroll
tax
schedule
(relative
to
the
existing
system)
with equality between payroll tax contributions and benefit charges.
consistent with equality between payroll tax contributions and benefit charges.
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Figure 1
Figure 1!
Illustrative UI Payroll Tax Schedules

Illustrative UI Payroll Tax Schedules
Tax Rate
B
B'

τmax

A

τmin
Worse

Better
Layoff Experience Measure

Note:
A is
baselineillustrating
tax schedule
illustrating
rating and
Notes: Schedule
A Schedule
is a baseline
taxaschedule
experience
ratingexperience
and the maximum
tax the
maximum
tax
rate.
Schedules
B
and
B'
illustrate
alternative
schedules
that
rate. Schedules B and B’ illustrate alternative schedules that a state might implement if its trusta
might implement if its trust fund became depleted.
fund becamestate
depleted.
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Figure 2
Aggregate UI Reserve and Cost Ratios, 1960–2012
Reserve 4.0
and
Cost
3.5
Ratios
(percent) 3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
-0.5
-1.0

Reserve Ratio (Reserves as Percent of Total Wages)
Cost Ratio (Tax Contributions as Percent of Total Wages)

Notes: The aggregate reserve ratio is the sum of all states’ year-end trust fund reserves as a
percentage of all states’ total payrolls in that year. The aggregate cost ratio is the sum of all
states’ regular UI tax contributions as a percentage of all states’ total payrolls (both over the same
year).
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, Office of
Unemployment Insurance, ET Financial Data Handbook 394 Report. <http://
workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/hb394.asp>
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Figure 3

Figure 3!
Federal and State UI Tax Bases, 1970–2012
Federal and State UI Tax Bases, 1970 to 2012!
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Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, Office of
Unemployment Insurance, ET Financial Data Handbook 394 Report. <http://
workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/hb394.asp>
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